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Elements when bombarded with neutrons emit a gamma ray that is characteristic of the 
isotope that underwent a neutron induced nuclear reaction; this is known as neutron 
activation.  The characteristic gamma energy of an isotope can then be detected and 
recorded.  One can then analyze the gamma energies captured and determine the 
elemental makeup of the sample.  This form of analysis can be used in an underwater 
environment making it potentially a valuable tool for agencies tasked with maritime 
security of ports and waterways, or clean-up operations.  This thesis will focus on the 
feasibility of neutron interrogation using pulsed fast/thermal neutrons in an underwater 
environment for detecting various chemical substances in metal containers.  A 
hermetically sealed, submersible container was used to test a d-T neutron generator’s and 
semiconductor detector’s functionality underwater in regards to detecting such chemicals 
as sulfur, nitrogen and chlorine rich materials.  
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Section 1.1 The Criminal and Terrorist Threat 
The potential for entities to do harm to the U.S. and the American way of life 
exists in the form of underwater smuggling and transportation of chemical, biological, 
radiological & nuclear (CBRN) threats and illegal contraband, but if we could detect 
these threats and contraband using applicable and practical technology we can continue to 
uphold our way of life.  Illegal smuggling of such items is common place in American 
ports and off shore.  There are multiple modes of trafficking used by smugglers to 
introduce weapons, narcotics, and other illegal cargo into the United States.  In 2009, 
there were 24,737 kg of drugs seized that were transported via maritime means 
(Department of Justice, 2010).  With most major maritime smuggling occurring through 
the Caribbean, see Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Drug Flow into the United States (Figure courtesy of Business Insider) 
1 
2 
One method traffickers’ use is the “narco-submarine”.  The narco-submarine is a 
self-propelled, submersible vehicle which drug traffickers use to transport drugs into the 
United States, Mexico and Caribbean countries.  Beginning in the 1990s, drug traffickers 
began using narco-subs for transporting their merchandise because of their difficulty to 
detect by means of radar, sonar, or infrared systems.  On average one of these vessels can 
reach speeds of 15 miles per hours while transporting up to 10 metric tons (Ramirez, 
2016).  There is also an unmanned submersible, known as the narco-torpedo that also 
functions similarly to the narco-sub.  It is a torpedo style container that is typically filled 
with narcotics towed behind another vessel.  The narco-torpedo is released if authorities 
approach and is recovered at a later time (Ramirez, 2014).  Though typically this medium 
for smuggling is used by drug traffickers, there are known ties between the drug trade and 
terrorism, thus opening up the potential for terroristic threats to be smuggled in this 
fashion as well.  Admiral James Stavridis, former Joint Commander for all US forces in 
the Caribbean, Central and South America, wrote, “We need to be able to rapidly detect 
and interdict this new type of threat, both for its current effects via the drug trade, and – 
more troublingly – for its potential as a weapon in the hands of terrorists.” (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2012). 
Another commonly used method of underwater smuggling is the smuggling 
parasite container.  These containers are welded, clamped or magnetically attached to the 
hull of a ship and contain drugs, weapons or other contraband.  These parasite devices 
may or may not be known by the crew, they are attached to the vessel because they are 
hidden beneath water and those working with the drug organizations detach or open the 
boxes, and then move the cargo once the ship is in port (Anderson, 2011).  Law 
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enforcement authorities, such as Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), use dive 
teams to search the hulls of ships for such containers, as well as sweeps of the sea floor 
and underwater structures for explosives and other suspicious activity (U.S. Immigrations 
and Customs Enforcement, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.2 Parasite Smuggling Box that was clamped to the hull of a vessel 
(Figure courtesy of the Washington Post) 
One further method of underwater smuggling used by traffickers today is using 
shipping vessels with a false hull or false propeller shaft.  Vessels with these have secret 
compartments that traffickers use to store contraband in while the vessel seemingly 
transports legal goods.  A false hull and propeller shaft can be detected using ultrasound 
scans (Hardesty, 2014).  However, the ultrasound scan is unable to determine the contents 
of such a compartment.   
Divers are another threat as they can be used to smuggle contraband, or place 
explosive devices or other dangerous items in and along the shoreline.  Divers can 
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however be easily detected by sonar and are not likely to evade detection at any high 
value target, i.e. any major port in the United States.  There is always the possibility these 
divers go undetected however, and as a result they may place some unknown device in an 
underwater setting that would need to be investigated.   
Through each of these methods of smuggling and trafficking there is always the 
unknown aspect of what these containers may contain or these devices may actually be.  
This is an important aspect because inevitably human intervention will occur and before 
this intervention can occur, it must be known what the divers or other operators are 
coming into contact with.  This is a major safety concern, as these containers while most 
likely contain illegal drugs have the possibility of containing chemical, biological, 
nuclear or radiological threats.  These threats would have detrimental repercussions if 
improperly handled and dealt with.   
 
Figure 1.3 ICE diver searching for smuggled threats on the hull of a ship (Figure 
courtesy of the Washington Post) 
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Section 1.2 Current Methods of Detection and Determent   
The current system used by the US Coast Guard and other Maritime security 
forces to protect our ports from these smuggled threats is known as the Underwater Port 
Security System (UPSS). This two part system both detects and deters potential threats or 
smugglers by detecting, tracking, classifying and interdicting intruders, and inspecting 
hulls, piers, other underwater structures, and anything else that is underwater (Thomas, 
2015).  The first line of defense in the underwater port security system is the real time 3D 
sonar used to monitor the waters of a port even in zero visibility conditions. The second 
step in the UPSS is an Integrated Anti-Swimmer System. This system includes an 
underwater loud speaker designed to warn divers/swimmers that they are in a secure area, 
and it also includes an underwater shockwave system that can force divers to the surface. 
Section 1.3 Principles of Neutron Activation Analysis  
While the UPSS is effective at detecting smuggled materials and stopping divers 
from entering protected ports, when a possible threat is actually detected a team of divers 
enters the water to investigate the item.  If that item is potentially harmful one must 
conduct a proper risk assessment regarding sending divers into the water to investigate. 
One possible technique for identifying the contents of a smuggled underwater container is 
by employing neutron interrogation, in the form of pulsed fast/thermal neutron analysis 
and prompt gamma neutron activation analysis, to identify the contents of said container. 
These techniques of nondestructive analysis are suited for this form of interrogation 
because of the quick detection results.  Also the generally small size and ease of 
transportability of equipment used in this form of analysis lend it to be more practical in 
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field measurements where conventional methods are unlikely to prove practical 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004). 
The process of neutron activation analysis (NAA) involves a (n, γ) nuclear 
reaction or a neutron capture.  “Activation Analysis” a term coined by Boyd (1949), 
involves neutron bombardment of a target element resulting in an inelastic collision with 
its nucleus creating a compound nucleus and immediate release of distinguishing gamma 
radiation.  The nucleus becomes radioactive in this excited state.  To de-excite, or decay, 
the nucleus emits distinguishing gamma radiation after the immediate or prompt gamma 
ray at a rate dependent upon the half-life of the of the now radioactive nucleus (Boyd, 
1949).  See Figure 1.4.  This nuclear “fingerprint” can be used to determine the identity 
of the elements in the original nonradioactive material (Corliss, 1964). 
Figure 1.4 (n,γ) reaction      
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The radiation is distinguishing because each element produces gamma radiation at an 
energy level typically measured on the electron-Volt (eV) scale coupled with a half-life 
that is unique to each isotope.  No other element decays at this energy level at this half-
life making this detection method reliable and accurate in determining atomic make-up. 
 Neutron activation analysis is however, the overarching technique and this 
experiment focuses on variations within.  One such variation is the technique of pulsed 
fast thermal neutron analysis (PFTNA).  This technique employs the production of pulsed 
neutrons at 14 MeV which are needed for reliable measurement of elements such as C 
and O.  These pulses occur for approximately 20µs at 14 MeV then tail off for 
approximately 80µs.  This pulse occurs at a frequency of 10 kHz and then after a 
predetermined amount of pulses, there is a subsequent longer pause in production 
allowing for detection of gamma rays from activated elements.  The 14 MeV neutrons, 
from the pulse, impinge on the sample object resulting in a number of nuclear reactions.  
The gamma rays from these reactions act as a fingerprint and can be used to identify the 
elements.  The various reactions include inelastic scattering, (n,n’γ), (n,pγ), and neutron 
activation (Barzilov, Womble & Vourvopoulos, 2003).  In between the pulses the 
remaining fast neutrons collide with the nuclei of light elements in the sample thus losing 
their energy.  Once the neutrons have less than 1 eV they are captured resulting in the 
(n,γ) reaction mentioned above.  The subsequent longer pause in the neutron production 
is implemented for the detection of elements that have been activated and require a halt in 
neutron bombardment to be viably detected. 
 The other variation of neutron activation analysis used in this experiment is 
prompt gamma neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), used in the detection of Cl.  This 
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technique measures prompt gamma rays that are emitted from the excited state of the 
sample nuclei within 10-14 seconds after neutron capture (Latif, Oura, Ebihara & 
Nakahara, 2013).  The prompt gamma emission is a result of thermal neutron capture 
reaction that occurs during the moments in between the pulses of 14 MeV neutrons  
 
Figure 1.5 Nuclear reactions initiated by slow (thermal) and fast neutrons in PFTNA 
during PFTNA.  This occurs due to the slowing of the neutrons from collisions with 
lighter elements within the sample.  The neutrons are then captured resulting in a prompt 
gamma ray which is then detected and used to identify and measure the element and 
quantities based on the distinguishable prompt gamma energy.                              
Section 1.4 Neutron Production 
  To initiate the nuclear reaction, the source material must be bombarded with 
neutrons.  There are multiple methods for neutron production and different kinetic energy 
levels at which the neutrons may be emitted.  Neutron sources include reactors, 
accelerators, portable generators, and radio-isotopic neutron emitters.  They are emitted 
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as thermal (<0.5 eV), epithermal (>0.5 eV to <0.5 MeV), and/or fast (>0.5 MeV) 
neutrons.   
 As the neutron source is turned on, it begins to bombard the sample with neutrons 
causing the nuclear reaction.  The sample is then exposed to the neutron bombardment 
for a period of time determined by the measurement sensitivity desired (Corliss, 1964).  
The longer the sample is exposed to the source, the greater the amount of the atoms will 
become radioactive, producing more gamma radiation making it more detectable.  
However, if the half-life of the sample material is short, it becomes unbeneficial to 
expose it to neutron bombardment for long periods of time because the radioactive 
isotopes will have decayed prior to being exposed to the detector.   
Section 1.5 Gamma Ray Spectroscopy  
Gamma ray spectroscopy, or gamma ray detection, is an analytical method that allows the 
identification and quantification of gamma emitting isotopes (Reguigui, 2006).  This is 
how neutron activation analysis becomes a valuable tool for chemical analysis.  Once 
bombarded by the neutrons, the sample emits the gamma rays that are detected and 
analyzed through this process.     
“The radioactivity produced by neutron reactions (most usually of the (n,γ) type) 
is analyzed by radiation measuring instruments. From such measurements, the 
radiation energy (or energies) and the half-life of the induced radionuclide can be 
determined with considerable accuracy,” (Blanchard and Leddicote, 1959).   
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Figure 1.6 High Purity Germanium Semiconductor detector with liquid               
Nitrogen (LN2) cooling tank (Figure courtesy of Ortec) 
The radiation measuring instrument, spoke of by Blanchard and Leddicote, used in this 
experiment is the semiconductor detector, see Figure 1.6.  A semiconductor detector is 
used in gamma ray detection because as a gamma ray passes through the semiconductor it 
produces free electrons and holes, a lack of an electron where one could exist, the number 
of electron and hole pairs is directly correlated with the energy level of the gamma within 
the detector.  The detection material of the semiconductor is arranged between two 
electrodes, and as the electron and hole pairs are produced they travel to the electrodes 
and produce a pulse that can be measured. The intensity of the resulting electrical pulses 
is a direct function of the intensity of the incident gamma ray.  As the amount of energy 
required to create an electron and hole pair is known, and this energy is completely 
independent of the energy of the incident radiation, the number of electron and hole pairs 
can be used to determine the intensity of the incident radiation (Knoll, 2000).  Knoll also 
states that in the semiconductor detectors, the variations in peak height are smaller and 
the resolution of the energy peak is greater, thus giving an advantage over other 
commonly used detectors such as scintillators.     
11 
 
Section 1.6 Quantifying the Data 
 Data collected in this manner is quantified by recording the counts, or number of 
electrical pulses that occurred within the semiconductor material.  One can cross 
reference the counts across the different intensities with a table describing the gamma 
energy levels of neutron bombardment induced radioactive isotopes, and determine the 
atomic make-up of the sample.  The electrical pulses are recorded as counts by digital 
signal processing (DSP) through a multichannel analyzer.  The digital signal processing 
converts the electrical pulses to a digital signal and then assigns the signal to a 
corresponding channel based on the energy level of the gamma ray and moment of 
emission.       
Based on the sensitivity of the detector it is becomes possible to determine 
quantity of the element measured within the sample as it relates to gamma intensity.  This 
is of course dependent upon the efficiency and resolution of the gamma detector.  The 
data is quantified in graph form using counts as the (y) parameter and energy level (keV) 
in the (x) parameter, see Figure 1.7.  The photopeaks in the graph are a result of higher 
counts at certain energy levels which are representative of the atomic make-up of the 
sample.  The height of the peaks is representative of the intensity of which the elements 
produced gamma rays as a result of the neutron bombardment.  The peaks are Gaussian in 
nature and as such can be fitted to determine the statistical error in a given peak based on 
a known gamma energy level. Error is dependent upon equipment used as different 
detectors produce more or less defined photopeaks.      
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Figure 1.7 Gamma Ray Spectrum of Pottery (Figure courtesy University of Missouri 
Archaeometry Laboratory)  
Section 1.7 Thesis Overview 
 The smuggling of narcotics is a constant issue faced by law enforcement agencies 
that are tasked to protect our borders.  There are many methods and techniques criminals 
use to accomplish their goal of bringing these illegal items into the United States.  
Maritime smuggling of said narcotics has been an ongoing issue that has seen little to no 
decline since the war on drugs began.  Due to the known connection between drug cartels 
and terrorist groups, it is possible that terrorists may attempt to use some of the 
techniques used by drug traffickers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction, which could 
be a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon, across the borders of the 
United States and our allies. 
13 
 
 Current detection methods for such smuggling are advancing, and many maritime 
smuggling operations are detected and stopped before they can reach the shore or port.  
However, human hands on interaction still plays a large part in these detection methods 
as an operator inevitably must handle any smuggling device located.  This experiment is 
being conducted to determine the feasibility of neutron interrogation use in an underwater 
environment to determine the contents of said smuggling containers.  In order to prevent 
the loss of human life due to contact with a possible threat located inside.  If the contents 
of the container can be identified prior to human exposure, a proper risk assessment can 
be conducted and proper measures can be taken to ensure the safety of all involved in the 
detection process.    
 The goal of this experiment is to protect the welfare of operators of maritime 
security entities engaged in their lawful duties protecting American ports and waterways 
by providing them with a method of identifying unknown materials underwater.  This is 
to be done by developing a practical method of employing neutron activation analysis 
based technique in an underwater environment.  The remote operated vehicle would be 
used to place the equipment in range of the object to be analyzed, see Figure 1.8, for a 
period of time long enough to make a proper analysis. 
     Figure 1.8 Example of an underwater ROV (Figure courtesy 
of Underwater Engineering, Ltd.) 
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Chapter 2 – Experiment 
Section 2.1 Overview 
 This experiment was conducted using a neutron generator in proximity to a target 
material in an underwater environment simulating field conditions.  All analyzing 
equipment was contained within a sealed container and submerged within a pool, see 
Figure 2.1.  The neutron generator was then energized and neutron bombardment of the 
sample would commence.  The sample would then become activated by the neutrons and 
emit characteristic gamma radiation.  The gamma rays were detected by a semiconductor 
detector, and data produced by the detector was analyzed via spectrum analysis software.  
That data was recorded as counts of gamma radiation, and graphed versus gamma energy 
level.  This comparison produces photopeaks at a distinguishing gamma energy level of 
the detected sample material.  The number of said counts would determine the 
effectiveness of the detection of the sample material within the underwater environment. 
 
 
    Figure 2.1 Representation of sealed container filled with the NAA equipment which 
was submerged underwater. 
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Section 2.2 Neutron Generator 
 There are multiple neutron sources that are used in scientific applications today, 
including nuclear reactors, radioisotopes, and accelerator based neutron reactors.  Due to 
the practicality and portability required for this experiment, a sealed tube neutron 
generator was used.  This compact device is a hermitically, sealed tube accelerator, see 
Figure 2.2.  It operates by producing either a deuterium + deuterium (2H + 2H) or a 
deuterium + tritium (2H + 3H) reaction.  This reaction occurs within the sealed, vacuum 
tube in which tritons (tritium nuclei) are accelerated into a deuterium-loaded target (Gow 
& Pollock 1960).  The (2H + 3H) reactions result in the production of a helium isotope 
and a neutron.  For this experiment 14 MeV were required; therefore, a neutron generator 
producing a deuterium + tritium reaction was used.  The reaction is as follows:  2H + 3H 
→ 4He + n.  This produces a ~14.1 MeV neutron (Chichester & Simpson, 2003).  The 
requirement of fast neutrons is due to the fact that analysis of elements, such as nitrogen 
(N), oxygen (O) and carbon (C), are often difficult to determine using other analytical 
techniques employing thermal neutrons.  The atomic ratios of C/O and N/O can be used 
to differentiate various materials (Papp & Csikai, 2011).         
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Figure 2.2 Sealed tube d-T neutron generator  
 The neutron generator produces the 14 MeV neutrons pulses isotropically, see 
Figure 2.3, and therefore all materials within range become activated that are not 
shielded.  This produces background radiation that will be detected by the semiconductor.  
To mitigate the unintended neutron activation within the detector, lead (Pb) and high 
hydrogen content (H) shielding was placed separating the detector and the generator.  
Isotropic production is however beneficial because the neutron generator does not have to 
be aimed in any certain direction at the sample material, just within its proximity.    
 Figure 2.3 An example of Isotropic Production 
showing neutrons as they disperse in 4π steradians from the point source of the neutron 
generator 
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The maximum effective distance underwater between the neutron source and the 
irradiated object is approximately 1 meter (Barzilov, Novikov & Womble, 2009).       
Section 2.3 Semiconductor Detector 
 Many inorganic and organic materials have detection properties (Valkovic, 2015), 
thus there are multiple options for which type of detector to use.  Each type of detector 
has its advantages and disadvantages.  However in this experiment, a Canberra Cryo-
Pulse 5 High Purity Germanium (HPGe) semiconductor detector was used.  The 
advantage of this detector is its superior resolution compared to scintillation detectors 
(Barzilov, Novikov & Womble, 2012).  Superior resolution results in the well-defined 
photopeaks produced when graphing the data relative to other scintillation materials, see 
Figure 2.4.  This type of detector has a relatively low band gap, see Figure 2.5, and has to 
be cooled in order to reduce the electrical noise incurred as electrons cross the gap at 
higher temperatures (Canberra, 2014).  The cooling of the detector was achieved by a 
built in cooling system utilizing a Canberra cryostat device.  The system electrically cools 
the high purity germanium to a temperature of approximately 77ᵒ K.  This achieves the 
high efficiency with the result being well-defined photopeaks in the 10 to 10,000 keV 
range.  During each analysis while the neutron generator was energized and bombarding 
the target, the detector was also active, detecting the prompt gamma rays from the (n,n’γ) 
reaction being expelled by the excited isotopes as neutrons impinged on the target 
sample.  This reading would be stored and then a second detection would take place, 
utilizing the same detector, of the thermal neutron activation.  This would be stored in a 
second memory location.  As stated above, the detector was shielded from the neutron 
generator using lead shielding and high hydrogen content shielding. An HPGe crystal is 
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sensitive to the high energy neutrons, which cause detector damage (Tsoulfanidis & 
Landsberger, 2010).  A specific trial time was used to ensure enough counts were 
captured by the detector to produce a quantitative analysis.     
 
Figure 2.4 Comparison of photopeaks produced by a Germanium detector and a Sodium 
Iodide scintillation detector (Figure courtesy of Texas A&M – Nuclear Security Science 
and Policy Institute) 
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Figure 2.5 representation of a band gap in a semiconductor (no gap in a conductor) 
 
Figure 2.6 Canberra HPGe Detector with electric cryostat 
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Section 2.4 Data Analysis 
 As the detector recorded energy counts of distinguishing gamma rays, it passed 
this information along as a count per channel.  Each analysis produced 8192 channels 
with associated energy counts.  The spectrum analysis software used to convert the data 
from the detector to readable data was hardware and software developed for use with the 
detector by Canberra in the Lynx Digital Signal Analyzer (DSA).  The device records the 
energy counts and assigns each set of counts a unique channel, and this is done in 
multiple processes.  The Lynx DSA is capable of recording dual sets of counts in its two 
memory banks as it can read two sets of channels simultaneously.  Initially, during the 14 
MeV neutron pulse the system analyzes the signal from the detectors and registers the 
gamma rays produced by the (n,n’γ) reaction of C and O; it then stores that information 
in particular memory bank.  Subsequently during the time between pulses the Lynx DSA 
analyzes the signal from the same detector and registers the gamma rays being emitted 
from the reactions caused by the now thermal neutrons (the neutron capture reaction 
(n,γ)), used to identify H, Cl, N, S, etc.  This signal is then stored in another memory 
location.  The software within the Lynx DSA then converts signals into a counts given in 
their respective channel.  The counts are then in a readable text format.          
The counts would then be formatted in a spreadsheet readily showing how many 
counts per each channel as a counts versus channel table.  It was then determined that the 
distinguishing energy levels of hydrogen and oxygen, which had abundantly clear 
photopeaks within the analysis due to the H2O environment the experiments took place 
in, would be used to calibrate the energy counts versus the energy levels, see Table 2.1.  
The calibration was accomplished by determining which channel each of these 
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characteristic energy levels would be attributed to.  This was apparent as the energy 
photopeaks, and, therefore, count levels, for H and O were always the highest due to the 
environment.  Energy level was then graphed versus channel and fitted to a slope, using 
mx+b = slope, see Figure 2.7.  This slope was then used to graph energy (keV) versus 
counts.  The result being a graph showing photopeaks at characteristic gamma energy 
levels for H2O and the sample material being analyzed, see Figure 2.8.   
Element  Energy (keV) 
Hydrogen (H) 2223 
Oxygen (O)  6130 
O first release 5619 
O second release 5108 
        Table 2.1 Distinguishing Gamma Energies 
22 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Slope fitting calibration for characteristic energy levels vs counts 
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Figure 2.8 Example of Graphical Analysis of characteristic gamma energy 
Section 2.5 Conducting the Experiment  
 This experiment was conducted in a rural location, partly a safety precaution and 
partly a convenience, where the simulated underwater environment was set up.  This 
simulated environment was a standard diameter pool, approximately 7.5m and a depth or 
approximately 1.2m.  The water contained within the pool did not contain any 
disinfectant or sterilizing chemicals to produce a more realistic field environment to 
include freshwater algae and bacteria.   
 The neutron generator and the HPGe detector were both placed within the sealed 
container and separated by lead and low Z shielding shielding.  The lead shielding was in 
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the form of bricks and was approximately 10cm in width between the generator and 
detector.  Digital control and power cords were run through an opening in the top of the 
container to the control module and power source.  The container was then raised up and 
lowered into the pool using a mobile hoist system.  The container was buoyant and had to 
be submerged using lead bricks that were fashioned to a tray at the bottom of the 
container.  The container would then be positioned next to the target sample material.   
 The sample material was contained within a steel container that was also 
submerged using lead bricks placed atop it.  The sample materials analyzed included 
NaCl, Sulphur (S), and Urea (N).  Prior to analysis of these samples the detector would 
be calibrated using Co-60 and Cs-137.  Chlorine is a powerful irritant that can inflict 
damage to the eyes, nose, throat and lungs, and at high concentrations and prolonged 
exposure it can cause death by asphyxiation (Romano, Lukey & Salem, 2007).  Sulphur 
is another chemical surrogate representing sulfur mustard or mustard gas.  It has the 
ability to form large blisters on any exposed skin or affect the respiratory and/or digestive 
systems (Center for Disease Control, 2013).  Urea was used in this experiment to check 
system ability to detect presence of nitrogen in an underwater environment.  
 Each trial of the experiment was conducted for a predetermined time period.  
During each trial, the neutron generator would be energized for the duration and the 
detector would be detecting gamma radiation for the extent of the trial as well.  The 
detector would then relay data to the Lynx DSA which would record said data.  The data 
would then be analyzed and a determination of detectability for the sample material was 
made.               
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Chapter 3 – Results 
Section 3.1 Calibration of the Detector 
 Typical gamma spectra produced in each trial of this experiment began with a 
calibration of the detector.  Detector calibration was achieved through the use of 
radionuclides Cobalt-60 (Co-60) and Cesium-137 (Cs-137).  The respective radionuclides 
produce gamma radiation at a known, constant energy, 662 keV for Cesium-137, and 
1173 keV & 1333 keV for Cobalt-60 respectively.  Calibration was achieved by 
observing the counts recorded by the detector at channels appropriate for the respective 
energy level.  Through previous observation it was determined Cs-137 produced a 
defined photopeak with approximately twice the height of the two photopeaks produced 
by Co-60.  Cs-137 resulted in approximately 1000 counts over a trial time of 1800 
seconds, and Co-60 resulted in approximately 500 counts in both of its defined 
photopeaks at the same trial time, see Figure 3.1.  Both radionuclides were measured 
simultaneously during detector calibration.          
 After measurements were taken, the data was placed in a table of counts vs 
detector channel.  It was determined the channels with the highest number of counts were 
the respective energy levels of Cs-137 and Co-60.  The energy level was then graphed 
against the channel number and fit with an mx + b slope to determine the resulting energy 
of each detector channel, see Figure 3.2.  The slope of 1.5986 was multiplied by channel 
numbers resulting in the basis for the energy levels on the x-axis of the graph seen in 
Figure 3.1.   
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Figure 3.1 Detector calibration using Cs-137 & Co-60 showing their respective 
photopeaks at 663 keV, 1173 keV, and 1333 keV 
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Figure 3.2 Calibration of gamma energy vs channel number 
 
Section 3.2 Background Analysis 
 The first measurement taken after the detector had been calibrated was of the 
inherent background gamma radiation, or noise, from the test environment.  This 
measurement was taken with the equipment submerged in the simulated underwater 
environment.  Background radiation had to be taken into consideration when determining 
the results of the experiment due to this source of radiation being measurable which may 
skew the data in some instances.  For this trial there were no artificial sources of 
radiation, beyond the neutron generator, applied by the conductors of the experiment nor 
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were there any sample materials applied to be measured.  The resulting spectrum shows 
Hydrogen (H), Oxygen (O), Lead (Pb) and Carbon (C) in high concentrations, see Figure 
3.3.  Hydrogen and Oxygen are in abundance due to the underwater environment in 
which the experiment was conducted.  Lead was measured as it was used for shielding 
the detector from the neutron generator which would damage the detector and it was also 
used to submerge the detection equipment.  The presence of carbon was detected due to 
its presence in the surrounding environment and shielding materials used.   
 As with all of the trials once the radiation counts were determined, the counts 
must be calibrated against the gamma energy levels, see Figure 3.4. The slope of this line 
= 2.0621 creating a proper fit for the counts vs energy graph.  Figure 3.4 is an example of 
the slope fitting used to fit the gamma energy counts to the corresponding energy.  This 
was part of each analysis.  For this and all subsequent analyses hydrogen and oxygen 
counts were used to determine the relation of detector channel to energy level.  The 
calibrations were conducted by determining the first extreme photopeak was hydrogen 
and the subsequent three extreme peaks were the different releases of oxygen and fitting 
the slope that way. 
 Once the calibration has taken place, the information can be analyzed.  The area 
of the photopeaks is equivalent to the gamma intensity being detected for said element.  
When determining gamma intensity the following formula is used: 
     Iγ = ϕ × σ × a  
Where Iγ is the intensity of the incident gamma, ϕ is the incident neutron flux (n/m2/s), σ 
is the nuclear cross section of the element, and a is the atomic quantities of an element.  
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Given that the measured area of the photopeak is the gamma intensity, and assuming a 
constant ϕ, we can use the following equation to determine the atomic ratios.   
     a = Iγ/σ  
In particular C/O and C/N are of interest.  The atomic cross sections of each of the three 
elements are seen in Table 3.1, as well as the cross section of S and Cl which will also be 
discussed.   
For these determinations gamma intensities are found by measuring the area of 
the photopeak using a peak area function in Igor Pro analysis software.  The area of the 
peak is determined by fitting the data with a baseline to account for background noise, 
subtracting said baseline and measuring the area of the remaining peak at the gamma 
energy of interest.  Table 3.2 represents the gross and net areas of peaks that will be used 
in further analysis in this experiment.   
Element En  Cross Section (mb) γ-ray (keV) 
C 14 MeV 184.7 4438 
N <1 eV 75.45 5110, 10833 
O 14 MeV 82.54 5108, 5619, 6130 
S <1 eV 523.53 5420 
Cl <1 eV 33070.23 1165, 6110, 6619 
Table 3.1 nuclear cross sections 
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Figure 3.3 Graph of the background radiation with no sample material present 
Background 
Element 
 
keV 
γ - intensity      
Gross 
 
Net 
C 4432 1348 185.33 
N 10833 ---- ---- 
O 6130 3840 2347.1 
S 5420 ---- ---- 
Cl 1165, 6619 ---- ---- 
Table 3.2 Peak areas of observed elements in the background 
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Figure 3.4 Energy to channel calibration for the background radiation or “noise” 
 To determine whether an element was present in the background or not, a 
minimum detection limit was established.  This limit was based upon the background 
noise of the experiment.  As mentioned above, a baseline measurement was formed to 
account for this background.  The minimum detection limit (σ) for this experiment is 
equal to the square root of the baseline using the full width of the photopeak.   
     σ = √IB  
Where I = γ intensity and B = baseline in this equation. The photopeak is identified and 
its area measured.  Then using the width of the peak, the area of the baseline is 
determined.  If the net area of the photopeak produced by an isotope is larger than σ it is 
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deemed as a detectable result.  All figures listed in Table 3.3 were detectable using this 
method of determining minimum detection limit, and this is true for all other photopeak 
detection in this experiment.  
 Another factor to consider about detectability is the uncertainty of the 
measurements taken by the detector.  While the detector is calibrated using constants, 
there is still inherent uncertainty within the measurements.  Uncertainty in element 
identification can be determined by locating the photopeak centroid at the full peak 
energy location then determining accuracy verses a known, expected value, shown in a 
normal distribution.  Gamma intensity uncertainty can be determined by using the 
activity peak width at the full width half max height.  A Poisson distribution can be used 
to show the probability that the measured intensity is within an acceptable level of 
uncertainty.             
Section 3.3 Detection of NaCl 
 The gamma spectrum resulting from the neutron activation of NaCl (salt) can be 
seen in Figure 3.5 and 3.6.  The spectra do not show defined photopeaks for both the 
chlorine gamma energies of interest.  Analysis shows the counts within the acceptable 
region of the energies for Cl, 1165 keV and 6619 keV, in both Figures 3.5 and 3.6 is 
within the standard deviation of the baseline as well as below the minimum detectable 
limit.  Figure 3.7 shows the Cl at 6110 keV, but once again there is no detectable signal 
for the chlorine at this energy.  This may be due to the photopeak of O at 6130 keV 
engulfing the 6110 keV photopeak, but it did not show any skew towards 6110 keV when 
compared to other spectra with no chlorine samples.  Sodium is also present in NaCl, 
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however this author was only concerned with the detection of chlorine due to its 
weaponized nature.  
  
Figure 3.5 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated NaCl underwater at 1165 keV 
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Figure 3.6 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated NaCl underwater at 6619 keV 
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Figure 3.7 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated NaCl underwater at 6110 keV 
Section 3.4 Detection of Sulfur 
 The prompt gamma rays produced by sulfur when it captures thermal neutrons in 
between the 14 MeV neutron pulses should display a signal at 841 keV and 5420 keV.  
The signal at 841 keV is, however unuseful due to too much interference.  Therefore, this 
analysis focuses on the energy signal at 5420 keV.  This spectrum was once again 
analyzed as before and it was determined sulfur (S) does not have a detectable photopeak 
using this methods utilized in this experiment.  Figure 3.8 shows that there is no visible 
photopeak above the standard deviation of the baseline.   
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Figure 3.8 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated sulfur at 5420 keV underwater 
Section 3.5 Detection of Nitrogen 
 In this gamma spectrum from the activation of a urea sample in the underwater 
environment, a photopeak can be observed which could contain the gamma signature of 
both oxygen second release and that of nitrogen .  The    photopeak shows that since the 
gamma signatures of both elements are extremely close together, with oxygen having a 
characteristic gamma of 5108 keV and N being at 5110 keV, this could be a dual 
photopeak.  In this spectrum, there are not two defined photopeaks at approximately 5110 
keV.  Although there is a clear valley between the peaks, which could constitute the 
different signatures of both oxygen and nitrogen, looking at the skew of the centroid of 
the photopeak when compared to other samples shows that this is not skewed towards a 
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nitrogen 5110 keV photopeak.  
 
Figure 3.9 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated nitrogen (5108 keV) underwater 
 Nitrogen also produces a 10833 keV gamma signature from the (n,γ) reaction.  
This energy level is towards the maximum detectable energy for the dectector used in this 
experiment.  Analysis of this portion of the spectrum once again shows no detectable 
photopeak of nitrogen above the minimum detectable limit when determined using 
standard deviation.  Figure 3.10 shows this spectrum in relation to its baseline 
measurement.   
 Urea samples can be detected using their C/O and C/N ratios.  This experiment 
showed that the gamma intensities of C and O in the Urea were actually less than that of 
the gamma intensities of the background measurements when comparing the net 
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photopeak areas of the two.  Table 3.3 shows the net photopeak areas of C and O from 
the Urea compared to that of the background.  These areas were determined by 
subtracting the baseline from the counts and then calculating the area of the remaining 
photopeak.  Higher concentrations of C and O were expected in the urea sample reading, 
but were not detected. 
Figure 3.10 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated nitrogen at 10833 keV underwater 
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 PHOTOPEAK AREA  
 BACKGROUND UREA 
C 185.33 22.525 
O 2347.1 2225.2 
Table 3.3 Photopeak areas of C and O in urea and background 
Section 3.6 Detection of Narcotics 
The gamma ray spectrum resulting from the neutron activation of the cocaine 
surrogate can be seen in Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13.  The major elements to 
be detected in narcotics are nitrogen (N), carbon (C), oxygen (O) and hydrogen (H).  The 
photopeaks show extreme count levels for both hydrogen and oxygen.  Extreme counts 
can be observed for oxygen in Figure 3.11.  This is expected due to the experiment being 
conducted underwater.  Due to the neutron activated hydrogen and oxygen from the 
water, comparisons to the background gamma intensity for H and O can be used to 
determine the detectability of the samples.  However, in these trials in the background 
readings the gamma intensities for that of C and O are greater than that of the gamma 
intensities in the trials measuring the simulant.  This is also true for the Urea 
measurements.  This results in a confounding of the readings because there is no baseline 
to compare the O photopeak to making it impossible to get an accurate C/O or C/N ratio. 
An accurate measure of O is required to make a determination of the presence of 
nitrogen based fertilizer compared to other materials.       
Nitrogen is potentially observed as being detected in Figure 3.11, as there is a 
dual peak visible once again at approximately 5110 keV which is where oxygen and 
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nitrogen share a charactersitic gamma energy, at 5108 keV and 5110 keV respectively.  
This dual photopeak once again has a valley seperating the peaks, but analysis of the peak 
shows no skew towards a N photopeak when compared to other samples.  Figure 3.12 
examines the presence of N at the 10833 keV photopeak.   
The attempt at making any discernable measurement of a carbon photopeak can 
be viewed in Figure 3.13.  In this spectrum carbon is not shown as present as there is no 
photopeak above the minimum detection limit. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated cocaine surrogate underwater (N at 
5110 keV) 
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Figure 3.12 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated nitrogen at 10833 keV underwater in 
a cocaine simulant 
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Figure 3.13 Gamma spectrum of neutron activated carbon (4439 keV) from the sample 
placed in the underwater enviroment 
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Section 3.7 Results Overview 
The gamma ray spectrum for each sample material shows no detection qualities in 
the underwater environment.  The NAA of NaCl showed no defined photopeaks for either 
Cl or Na.  Chlorine has been measured at observable photopeaks of 1165, 6110 an 6619 
keV in previous studies, but did not show a presence in the samples of NaCl when 
measuring prompt gamma rays.  The sample of sulfur which was subject to the same 
PGNA analysis does not show a defined photopeak at its characteristic gamma energy of 
841 keV or at its known prompt gamma energy of 5420 keV.   
In regards to nitrogen rich material detection using FNAA from the 14 MeV pulse 
no discernable data could be recorded for C or N making C/O and C/N ratios impossible.  
Also, innacurrate measurements of O due to the high concentration of water present in 
the enviroment further hampered the detection of the nitrogen rich materials. 
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Chapter 4 – Discussion 
The intended goal of this project was to determine the feasibility of using PFTNA 
in an underwater environment to protect human life from unknown threats that may be 
looming in ports and waterways.  If this technique can be utilized in a practical manner to 
determine the contents and make up of devices attempted to be concealed underwater, 
this author believes this technique can protect the lives of the operators that are going 
hands on with these concealed threats by giving them the foreknowledge of what exactly 
they will be handling.  
It was shown in Barzilov, Novikov and Womble (2009) using Monte Carlo 
Simulations, that detection of chemical materials underwater using PFTNA and 
isotropic neutron production is indeed possible.  The assembled experimental 
setup used in this experiment, was tested in relevant environmental conditions.  It 
has been shown that the system can indeed detect gamma rays from the irradiated 
environment.  However, we note that there are a number of difficulties.   
 It is difficult to differentiate an oxygen signal from an irradiated sample 
from the background oxygen signal.   
 The water environment acts as a very effective shielding and thermalizer 
to the 14 MeV neutrons.  This leads to a significant decrease in production 
of the (n,n’γ) reaction, and hence a significant suppression of gamma 
signal from those reactions, which are necessary for detection of C and O.   
 The water also acts gamma ray shielding reducing observed gamma 
signals even more.   
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 It seems that “naïve” data analysis routines employed in this study doesn’t 
allow for reliable extraction of signals from gamma ray spectra. 
Based on obtained results, the following future research can be proposed: 
 Other types of gamma ray detectors should be tested.  For example, BGO 
detectors, although having worse energy resolutions, have much higher 
efficiency, which could lead to higher observed signal. 
 A more sophisticated routine data analysis could be used.  For example, it 
was shown that spectral decomposition technique or wavelet analysis 
could help to extract small signals in a presence of high background 
signal.   
 Further Monte Carlo based simulations are needed to optimize geometry 
of the system.  Such parameters as a geometrical size of shielding, and 
different varieties of shielding materials should be optimized more so.    
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